Many believe that the recent emphasis on enterprise risk management function is misguided, especially after the failure of sophisticated quantitative risk models during the global financial crisis. The concern is that top-down risk management will inhibit innovation and entrepreneurial activities. We disagree and argue that risk management should function as a Revealing Hand to identify, assess, and mitigate risks in a costefficient manner. Done well, the Revealing Hand of risk management adds value to firms by allowing them to take on riskier projects and strategies. But risk management must overcome severe individual and organizational biases that prevent managers and employees from thinking deeply and analytically about their risk exposure. In this paper, we draw lessons from seven case studies about the multiple and contingent ways that a corporate risk function can foster highly interactive and intrusive dialogues to surface and prioritize risks, help to allocate resources to mitigate them, and bring clarity to the value trade-offs and moral dilemmas that lurk in those decisions. 2008 has led to legislation and regulations requiring an increased role for enterprise risk management. Some believe, however, that increasing the power and influence of risk management will have an adverse effect by inhibiting innovation and entrepreneurial activities. Such concerns are not unique to the current era; the developmental economist Albert Hirschman believed that too much concern about future threats can discourage people from undertaking bold new ventures. He introduced a principle, which he called "the Hiding Hand," that explicitly excused incomplete and inadequate risk assessment. Not dwelling on future threats, he claimed, "can serve as a stimulus to enterprise" by encouraging otherwise risk-averse managers to take on risky projects that in the bright light of thorough risk assessment would appear infeasible. 2 We believe, to the contrary, that planning practices should be guided not by the Hiding Hand, but by a Revealing Hand that enables risks to be identified and then mitigated in a cost-effective manner. Risk management, as stated by veteran NASA systems engineer Gentry Lee, is "not a natural act for humans to perform." Well-documented psychological and sociological biases within organizations lead them to overlook important risks and to systematically underestimate and undermanage those they do identify.
risks are required to discipline corporate risk-taking and to limit to acceptable levels the expected consequences from risk-taking behavior. Most policymakers, regulators, and academics-particularly those who work or specialize in the financial services sectoragree that greater internal clarity about and public disclosure of material risks are likely to lead to better decision-making. But there is far less agreement about how the Revealing Hand of risk management should go about this assignment.
Some risk management experts embrace a culture of "quantitative enthusiasm."
They believe that the most important role of the corporate risk management function is to identify and then measure risks. Such risk "quants" rely on their ability to express risks in the form of statistical distributions, including the correlations among them, for use by corporate decision-makers when (1) comparing the expected outcomes of risky alternatives; (2) evaluating the effects of risky investments on the value and risk of the firm's entire "portfolio" of assets and businesses; and (3) benchmarking the firm's aggregate risk exposure against its risk appetite. Nassim Taleb and others have provided a forceful critique of this quantitative approach to risk management. They note that almost all financial risk models failed during the global financial crisis, and in other recent bouts of market volatility, to signal the huge losses (labeled by Taleb as "Black Swan" events) that occurred with far greater frequency than expected. 4 The failures of the models led to severe loss of confidence in quantitative risk managers as an effective Revealing Hand mechanism. If statistical models fail to function when they are needed the most, risk management necessarily "changes from science to art."
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The decline of quantitative risk models, however, should not prevent us from recognizing the potential value from implementing an effective corporate risk management function. Indeed, admitting that risk management is more art than science helps to introduce some humility into the risk function-and to the standards that govern this function-that should enable a company's risk management function to become more reliable and more effective. Such humility begins by recognizing that, among the range of management disciplines, risk management is one where measurement is particularly difficult and, indeed, a source of problems in its own right. Measurement generally involves the attempt to quantify events or phenomena that have already occurred or that already exist. But risk management addresses events in the future, those that have not yet 4 Taleb (2007) . 5 Stulz (2008: 43) .
occurred and many that may never occur. In many if not most circumstances involving risk management, completely objective measurement is clearly not possible-and thus a large element of subjectivity inevitably enters, and often ends up, properly, dominating the analysis. Financial markets are a partial exception to this observation to the extent that the past behavior of asset prices can be a reliable predictor of future price behavior. Academic studies tell us that this is true in general, perhaps more than 99% of the time. But as already noted, all bets are off during major discontinuities, when the Black Swans make their appearance. During these times, past price distributions and correlations provide little guidance on the magnitude of risk exposure and how to mitigate it.
Since the global financial crisis, many quantitative skeptics, including some from within the financial services sector, have challenged the quantitative risk managers. The skeptics advocate that effective risk management must go beyond measurable risks to encompass qualitative approaches that will better help managers in thinking about how good projects and strategies might turn bad, and how their organizations would fare under different scenarios.
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In this article, we examine the scope, the processes, and the consequences of the quantitative and qualitative components of risk management. We begin with the premise that those seeking to find common ground to reconcile the two approaches can learn from cases, both inside and outside the financial services sector, of challenges faced by the Revealing Hand of risk management, and how these can be overcome. To advocates and practitioners of quantitative risk management, the world of current corporate practice appears messy, political, and gloomy. In an article published in this journal eight years ago titled "Risk Management Failures: What Are They and When Do They Happen?" Rene Stulz offered the following assessment:
Once risk management moves away from established quantitative models, it becomes easily embroiled in intra-firm politics. At that point, the outcome depends much more on the firm's risk appetite and culture than its risk management models.
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In the pages that follow, we present a somewhat more optimistic view of risk management, one that does not abandon quantitative financial models, but does rely less 6 Mikes (2009 6 Mikes ( , 2011 . 7 Stulz (2008:43) heavily upon them. But in providing this moderately optimistic view of risk management, we provide an emphatic caveat emptor: We have studied many man-made disasters, both in the public and private sectors, and what we have found repeatedly is this: Early warning signs and risk information were available to operators and decision makers in advance of the events, but behavioral biases and organizational barriers prevented the information from being acted on. Despite much talk of "unknown unknowns" and "black swan" events, risk identification appears to be the lesser of two challenges. 8 The principal challenge faced by organizations and their risk managers is their failure to act in the face of accumulatingalbeit ambiguous and inconclusive-evidence of an imminent and catastrophic event.
Accordingly, one of the major aims of this article is to explore the role, organization, and limitations of risk identification and risk management, especially in situations that are not amenable to quantitative risk modeling.
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We have conducted multiple studies of organizations whose risk management systems have been characterized by both (1) longevity (they had been in existence for at least five years) and (2) credibility (they had the active support of top management). We have tried to understand how risk management tools and processes functioned within the strategy and operating environment of each company. These examples have helped us understand when technology and quantitative models are likely to be productively employed in risk management, and when risk management processes require extensive discussions and highly interactive meetings as a substitute for objective risk measurement.
The Principle of the Revealing Hand
The Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), a research and development center that manages capital-intensive, time-critical technological projects for the U.S. National
Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) unmanned space missions, experienced several costly and avoidable failures in the 1990s. 10 Post mortems revealed that JPL's risk assurance function, among its other shortcomings, was focused on checklists for quality 8 Turner (1976) ; Pidgeon and O'Leary (2000) . 9 See Stulz (2015) ; Mikes and Kaplan (2015) . 10 The Mars Climate Orbiter disappeared, during orbit insertion on Sept. 23, 1999, due to a navigation error; analyses had been performed and communicated using English units (feet and pounds) rather than NASAmandated metric units (meters and kilograms). The Mars Polar Lander disappeared as it neared the surface of Mars in December 1999. To save money, the Lander did not have telemetry during its descent to Mars and subsequent analysis suggested that the failure was probably due to a software fault that shut off the descent rocket too early, causing the spacecraft to fall the last 40 meters onto the surface.
control, while overlooking many risks-such as errors stemming from engineers working in English rather than Metric units-that had "incubated" for a long time in functional silos.
After the two spectacular failures in 1999, JPL hired veteran aerospace engineer Gentry Lee as chief system engineer-in effect the chief risk officer-to develop and implement a new risk management approach for its planetary and outer space missions.
Lee defined his role as "minister without portfolio, the person who made sure everything worked the way it was supposed to on a global scale." He described how he thought about mission risks: "At the start of a project, try to write down everything you can that is risky.
Then put together a plan for each of those risks, and watch how the plan evolves." 
Not a Natural Act for Humans to Perform…
As mentioned earlier, we now have extensive evidence of a general tendency of individuals, whether they face uncertainty alone or in large organizations, to place too much weight on recent events and experiences when forecasting the future. This leads them to grossly underestimate the range and adverse consequences of possible outcomes from risky situations. 13 Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman contrasts what he calls "System 1 thinking," which proceeds rapidly and is driven by instinct, emotion, and extensive practice, with "System 2 thinking," which is deliberate, analytical, and based on evidence.
This framework helps explain why risk identification is difficult. People, using their familiar and instinctive System 1 thinking, do not naturally activate the analytical and nonintuitive System 2 thinking required for effective risk management. Managers and employees, especially under budget and time pressure, become inured to gradually emerging risks and their System 1 thinking leads them to override existing controls and accept deviances and near misses as the "new normal"-a behavioral bias that has been given the wonderful name of "normalization of deviance." 14 By treating red flags as false alarms rather than early warnings of imminent danger, they end up tolerating unknowingly an increase in vulnerability to risk events. Companies also make the mistake of "staying on course" when they shouldn't. As events begin to deviate from expectations, managers instinctively escalate their commitment 15 to their prior beliefs, "throw good money after bad," and incubate even more risk.
In addition to these biases of individuals, organizational biases such as "groupthink" inhibit good thinking about risks. Groupthink arises when individuals, still in doubt about a course of action that the majority has approved, decide to keep quiet and go along. Groupthink is especially likely when the group is led by an overbearing, overconfident manager who wants to minimize conflict, delay, and challenges to his or her authority.
All these individual and group decision-making biases help explain why, in the years running up to the global financial crisis, so many organizations overlooked or misread ambiguous threats and failed to foresee the huge downside risks to their asset holdings and high leverage. Wall Street banks also hired the "best and the brightest,"
people with little if any past experience with failure. Their combination of brilliance, overconfidence, and impatience to succeed led to the creation of innovative, apparently highly profitable, but also highly risky securities in organizational cultures that celebrated and rewarded bold, short-term risk-taking. For example, during a decade of declining interest rates and macro-economic stability, Stanley O'Neal and Charles Prince, the CEOs of Merrill Lynch and Citigroup, respectively, pushed their companies to take on more risk to avoid being left behind in the race for trading profits.
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Especially in innovative, high-performing companies, it is hard for cost and profitconscious managers to invest more resources in risk identification and risk mitigation,
particularly when nothing appears to be broken. 17 Gentry Lee believed he would not have been given the authority or resources to install a risk management process at JPL unless and until a number of NASA's Mars and shuttle missions ended in catastrophic failures.
The Revealing Hand of risk management must be forceful and intrusive to allow individuals to activate "System 2" careful thinking about risk. It requires intrusive, interactive, and inquisitive processes to accomplish the following: (1) challenge existing assumptions about the world internal and external to the organization; (2) communicate risk information, aided by tools such as risk maps, stress tests, and scenarios; (3) and draw 15 Staw (1981) . 16 Nocera (2008) . 17 Mikes (2008) .
attention to and help close gaps in the control of risks that other control functions (such as internal audit and other boundary controls) leave unaddressed, thereby complementingthough without displacing-existing management control practices. As discussed later, the companies that we examined in our case studies deliberately introduced highly interactive and intrusive risk management processes to counter the individual and organizational biases that would otherwise inhibit constructive thinking about risk exposures. In short, they illustrated the Revealing Hand in action.
Limitations of Regulated and Standardized Risk Management
After the global financial crisis, consultants and policy makers reached the conclusion that, as articulated by Ernst & Young Partner Randall Miller, "companies with more mature risk management practices outperform their peers financially." 18 Consultants offered to show less risk-savvy companies how to reap the "likely profit margin increase" that has accrued to "risk management leaders… over the last three years" 19 and to achieve the spectacular EBITDA-differentials between the "top" and "bottom" of the risk management maturity scale. 
Risk Management Observed
Our bottom-up, inductive approach for understanding effective risk management programs sheds light on why risk management is difficult to codify and standardize. In Table 1 , we list the case studies that we have studied in detail. Others, as can be seen in our sample, have moved beyond this to a business partner role.
For example, JPL's risk function influences key strategic decisions, such as approval or veto of new projects, the quantity of resources dedicated to risk mitigation, and a final recommendation about whether to go forward with a planned mission launch. Risk management is effective at JPL because the personnel involved in the process have the domain expertise necessary to credibly challenge the risk-taking project engineers on their own turf and to interpret and react to changing conditions in and around JPL's projects.
In a third role, the independent facilitator, as practiced at Hydro One and the LEGO Group, the risk managers do not influence formal decision-making. Rather, they set the agenda for highly interactive risk management discussions and facilitate the communication of risk up, down, and across the organization. In this role, the CRO needs strong interpersonal and communication skills but not, necessarily, a high level of domain expertise. These CROs must operate with a degree of humility to stimulate broad and wideranging discussions that develop qualitative and subjective risk assessments. 26 Such assessments, in turn, help senior line managers set priorities among operational and strategy risks and allocate resources to mitigate them.
Working with limited formal authority and resources, this kind of humble, facilitating CRO builds an informal network of relationships with executives and business 26 Mikes (forthcoming) managers, with the aim of being neither reactive nor proactive while maintaining a careful balancing act between keeping one's distance and staying involved. Even without formal decision-making authority, the risk discussions facilitated by the humble risk manager are consequential; they identify, "map" and (to the extent possible) quantify risk exposures, and influence decisions and resource allocations by line managers who ultimately must execute risk management within their operations and authority.
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The apparent success of this independent facilitator model of risk management suggests that calls for increasing investments in risk management and for the formal inclusion of senior risk officers in the C-suite could be misguided. Many companies will be best served when the Revealing Hand of risk management occurs through the facilitation of risk talk and risk-based resource allocation-as opposed to top-down compliance enforcement and decision-making by the CRO. Our evidence suggests that this humble CRO role is most effective for companies incubating a wide array of risks, where neither regulatory compliance, nor any particular technical domain expertise, are required to stimulate System 2 analytic thinking and discussions about strategy risks among employees and line managers. Instead, the humble CRO brings together many different functions and market-facing units to share information and produce a common understanding of the diverse risks faced by the enterprise.
Finally, we identify a dual or hybrid role for risk management. As exemplified and practiced by the companies in our three financial services cases, the risk function balances compliance with business orientation by deploying separate groups of independent and embedded risk managers. It has been common in the financial services sector to lament the unreasonableness of regulators' demand for an independent risk management function.
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One CRO we interviewed (Saxon Bank) claimed that too much independence led to less impact: "When I came [to the role], the risk management function was… so independent as to be totally irrelevant. They wrote histories of risk after the fact, they wrote criticisms of what the business did. My first question to them was, 'Where were you, honeybun, when all this happened?'" 29 The CROs in our financial services cases were critical of efforts to make their role entirely about independence or all about business partnering. They recognized the tension and built separate organizations to handle both types of demands.
A central risk function performed the role of compliance champion and independent risk 27 Mikes (forthcoming) 28 Hall et al. (2015) ; Stulz (2015) . 29 Hall et al. (2015): 10) overseer. At the same time, they introduced a separate, experienced cadre of embedded risk managers, with considerable domain expertise, who worked closely within the line organization to continuously advise business decision-makers about changes in their realtime risk exposure.
The diverse case studies summarized in Table 1 influence the appropriate risk identification processes to be deployed, but the extent and kind of interdependencies in the task environment will likely be the dominant influence.
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For example, the reciprocal interdependencies across JPL's design teams and across the LEGO Group's core functions-product design, supply chain, and customer relationship management-required that their risk organization needed to have a broad span of influence if it was to conduct cross-functional risk discussions. By contrast, at Hydro One and in the financial-services cases, the organizational and project units performed separate functions. In these cases, the risk workshops could be focused on the project, department, business unit or portfolio at hand, and the range of participation in risk identification was determined by the diversity of functions involved within each of these organizational units.
Frequency of risk meetings. JPL's project engineers had to make trade-offs between a mission's scientific goals and the immutable laws of physics. The risks associated with a particular mission were largely known by the end of the initial project meeting, and the laws of physics would not be changing during the course of the project. The formal review meetings at which progress on risk mitigation were actively discussed could be done annually or even bi-annually. By contrast, Hydro One's risks continually evolved from 30 Mikes, Tufano, Werker, and De Neve (2009) . 31 Thompson (1967) changes in demand, regulation, interest rates, and equipment. Consequently, its CRO led risk workshops among employees and managers throughout the year, did face-to-face risk assessments semi-annually with each member of the senior executive team, and conducted (risk-based) resource allocation meetings annually. The LEGO Group, similarly experiencing continually evolving and diverse risks-from changes in children's play preferences to the availability of retail partners across the world-linked its scenario workshops about risk identification and their prioritization to the annual planning process.
At the Private Bank (asset management) division of a universal bank, and at the Investment Bank, risks changed hourly, or even from one trade to the next. At the Corporate Bank and the Retail Bank, risk shifted frequently enough to require continual monitoring and assessment by risk managers with strong domain expertise, embedded in the line organization. From these observations, we conclude that the frequency of risk identification and assessment processes must match the velocity of risk evolution, a bit of common sense that nevertheless tends to be lost in "one size fits all" compliance frameworks.
Risk tools. Most companies summarize risks with multidimensional visualizations,
such as risk maps, that subjectively quantify risks according to their expected likelihood, impact, and controllability. Hydro One and JPL conducted regular assessments and reviews of their subjectively ranked "top-10" risks. Financial services companies, with extensive historical data on asset pricing, covariance, and risk events, also used risk map summaries, but they added data-and analysis-intensive statistical assessments, such as value-at-risk calculations and stress tests.
The choice of risk tools, which ranged from qualitative descriptions and scenarios to complex calculations of expected loss and exposure, appears to be conditioned by (1) the availability of data and knowledge about a particular risk (loss) and (2) how relevant and reliable the available risk tools are in the eyes of risk experts (calculative cultures) and everyone else using the tools. Quantitative risk management becomes impossible when historical predictive data are unavailable or have lost their ability to predict because of a paradigm-shifting discontinuity. As Rene Stulz commented about the subprime crisis:
It was not possible to obtain a distribution of losses associated with a sharp downturn in real estate by using only historical data.… A risk manager would have needed to understand both the likelihood of a decrease in real estate prices, and the expected effect of such a decrease on the prices of those securities.
32 32 Stulz, (2008: 43) But even such extreme conditions should not stop the Revealing Hand of risk management from functioning effectively, as long as risk managers recognize the novelty of the situation and are willing to temporarily abandon their now-irrelevant quantitative models. For example, Goldman Sachs stopped relying on value-at-risk modeling when it became clear that the frequency of losses far exceeded the models' predictions. It emphasized instead its
proprietary daily marks-to-market across its entire subprime portfolio to assess risk exposure. At Retail Bank, risk managers co-opted the economist staff function to create scenarios that enabled them to gauge the evolution and possible severity of the financial crisis as it unfolded-again, extending the Revealing Hand by the use of alternative quantitative modeling.
Even among just the seven cases we examined in detail, effective risk managers functioned in a diversity of ways. A quest for universal prescriptions in risk management seems at best dubious, and at worst harmful-especially if it prevents companies from finding their way among the multiple dimensions of risk management to an approach customized and tailored to their specific situation.
What Can Risk Managers Learn from Man-Made Disasters?
As already noted, risk managers are currently riding a favorable tide as regulators, standard setters, and professional associations advocate the establishment of a strong risk management function. The conditions for the healthy growth of the risk management industry are highly favorable. Yet organizational disasters continue, and with growing visibility (among the most recent is Volkswagen's cheating-software scandal). Consultants have pointed to the capability gaps between increasing risks on the demand side and existing risk management programs on the supply side.
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As a former CRO of the Indian IT services company Infosys commented to us:
Everyone does risk management in bad times. The strong test of risk management is whether it works in good times. Will top management stand behind the risk managers, avoiding temptation, and saying no to things that put the enterprise at risk?
Managerial attention and resource allocation-in effect, active deployment of the Revealing Hand-are easy to sustain while the memory of a recent disaster or crisis is fresh. But attention can lag after a period of normality and stability. Also, new risks, such 33 PWC (2015).
as cyber-terrorism and cyber-security, can emerge slowly and with limited visibility. Risk management practices will always lag innovation. They operate in a catch-up mode, which is why even with extensive regulation, future financial crises remain likely.
In this section we draw on the literature on man-made disasters and conclude that mere enhancement of the Revealing Hand of risk management will not alone solve the bigger problem of management inertia and inaction.
In his pioneering book about man-made disasters published in 1978, British organizational sociologist Barry Turner argued that an incubation period, which includes communication breakdowns and unheeded warnings, precedes all man-made disasters. A chain, or several chains, of puzzling events, near-misses, errors, and partially understood occurrences develop in a way that is at odds with existing beliefs and norms about likely sources of risk. Disaster studies reveal that at least one person in a line management role typically has crucial, risk-relevant information that (in retrospect) could have triggered actions to prevent man-made disasters from occurring. 34 Researchers have also identified a recovery window, a period after the emergence of a clear threat, in which constructive action is feasible before the major accident occurs. 35 For example, in NASA's Challenger and Columbia disasters, crucial, although ambiguous, risk-relevant information reached decision-makers who conducted a discussion but failed to act.
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We recognize that hindsight, which is of course unavailable to actual decisionmakers at the crucial time, has 20-20 vision about the relevance of risk information. But even when functioning in real time and with information gaps, good risk management should have the capability to interpret and evaluate the potential downside implications from ambiguous signals-in effect, to activate System 2 thinking rather than respond instinctively and without challenging existing beliefs. Turner himself recognized this problem early on when he wrote:
The central difficulty therefore lies in discovering which aspects of the current set of problems facing an organization are prudent to ignore and which should be attended to, and how an acceptable level of safety can be established as a criterion in carrying out this exercise.
37 34 Pidgeon (,1997); Vaughan (1999) ; Edmondson et al. (2005) ; Watkins and Bazerman (2003) . 35 Roberto et al. (2006) 36 Vaughan (1996) ; Edmondson et al. (2005) . 37 Turner (1976:379) Indeed, one might go so far as to argue, as another scholar did 20 years after Weick (1998: 74) . We thank HEC student Jeannine Jeinitzer for this reference. 39 Simons (2009 Simons ( , 2010 Some companies use a so-called radar or spider chart to stimulate discussions and clarify beliefs about their risk appetite. 42 For each of the company's key stakeholdersincluding customers, employees, suppliers, and regulators-a risk radar chart identifies a set of objectives and a targeted confidence level associated with meeting each of those objectives. Second, the management team chooses a target risk appetite for each of the company's major stakeholders on an ordinal scale that is designed to be comparable across all dimensions. The managers acknowledge the reality that they cannot maintain equal risk exposure across their diverse constituents. They must make trade-offs in time and resource commitments among goals such as deliver high return-on-investment for shareholders, 40 Merck's chief competitor, Pfizer, with a very similar drug, Celebrex, and facing similarly ambiguous evidence, left it on the market after adding a black-box warning. By so doing, "Pfizer shareholders thus avoided losing billions of dollars in profits," as the Pfizer executives maintained their primary commitment to shareholder value (Simons, 2010: 4) . 41 Simons (2010: 4) . 42 Quail (2012 Hydro One's "risk appetite scale" and radar chart shown in Figure 1 provide the visual representation of these trade-offs.
--------------INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE: both risk appetite scale and radar chart-------------
The risk appetite scale enables managers and board members to discuss their willingness to compromise on any particular objective, should a trade-off become necessary, expressing the strength of commitment and priority attributed to the value or stakeholder group associated with that objective. The radar chart provides the mechanism for managers to discuss and agree to adaptations of the firm's risk appetite, as circumstances evolve, making clear the firm's choices-as proposed by management and ratified by the board.
At periodic risk review meetings, managers can compare their actual decisions to those espoused in their risk radar chart. In this way, the chart enables managers to monitor-and then decide to either tighten or relax-its risk exposure among multiple constituents.
We return to the case of the financial firm selling CDOs during the financial crisis.
Suppose that its decision-makers had an active mental model (a "mental risk radar chart") that visualized the firm's core values and stakeholder objectives. Then, when it had become clear that "the music had stopped," the decision to sell soon-to-be-worthless CDOs would have triggered a discussion of the trade-offs about to be made, and its implications in the short term and beyond. Following the decision, the mental or explicit risk radar chart of the firm's actual risk appetite would be updated to show a greater willingness to put longterm trading-partner relationships at risk relative to the firm's risk appetite for financial performance and, perhaps, survival. The decision to quickly exit the CDO asset class before the anticipated market decline revealed that the value of corporate survival superseded the value of long-term client relationships. Other firms decided not to merely exit or hedge their subprime risk exposure but rather to place a major bet by shorting the subprime market. After the financial crisis, these firms were widely criticized and litigated. But these examples illustrate the difficult choices firms can face; they are complex dilemmas that bring tension among the firm's commitment to serve its multiple and diverse stakeholders, including its own financial interests.
No Wall Street firm, to our knowledge, explicitly documented such trade-offs, nor would we expect them to have done this. But we believe that the Revealing Hand of risk management should make decision-makers aware of the potential conflicts of interests and moral dilemmas that are inherent in their most difficult decisions and actions. The
Revealing Hand should also prepare decision-makers for the inevitable backlash that follows such "defining moments" 43 and give them the confidence to defend those actions, as illustrated by the actions of Merck's CEO at the time of the Vioxx scandal. Creating such awareness and confidence requires intrusive, interactive and intensive debates about the organization's multiple values and stakeholders, the decision-makers' attachment to each of them, and the potential long-term consequences from a difficult decision made at a defining moment. The risk radar chart provides a summary of the conclusions from such debates and serves as a continuous guide for management decisions about the long-run consequences from difficult decisions.
Conclusion
The widespread failure of quantitative risk management during the financial crisis should not be the death knell for quantitative risk-management models. Value-at-risk, sensitivity analyses, risk maps, scenario planning, and risk appetite radar charts are important components within a firm's risk-management practices. The models, however,
should not be the sole-and rarely the most important-basis for decision-making. They cannot replace management judgment. They are best used to trigger in-depth, analytical, and rigorous discussions among managers and employees about the different types of risks faced by the firm, and about the dilemmas (financial and moral) involved in responding to them. Used in this way, firms avoid the artificial choice between quantitative and qualitative risk management, allowing both to play important roles in surfacing and assessing risks, and then to make decisions and allocate resources to mitigate the risks in a cost-efficient and moral manner. 
